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Chapter 7: An Evaluation Of An Agricultural Extension Project In Rwanda
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Arthur Rugango
Many health experts have become convinced that governments of developing countries, like those in East African, must implement a legislative program to improve small farmers' agricultural productivity. Increased agricultural productivity constitutes an essential
foundation for improving the health of developing countries' impoverished rural inhabitants. For governments to use law to implement that kind of program, grounded on the available evidence, drafters must use the available evidence to draft detailed legislation to give small farmers access to adequate, well-watered land; appropriate technologies; markets-- including transport, storage and processing facilities; and credit to finance their necessary expenditures. Without those prerequisites, small farmers cannot increase their production for sale in the markets to increase their incomes and improve their quality of life.498
Adopting this view, the Clinton Hunter Development Initiative (CHDI),499 working in cooperation with Partners in Health,500 introduced the Rwinkwavu pilot project. That project sought to provide support to over 6,000 subsistence farmers who, in the past, had neither applied fertilizers, used improved planting materials, nor had access to adequate farm tools.501 In 2006, the CHDI project hired 10 agronomes, each of whom sought to train some 6000 farmers in the use of better agricultural techniques like planting in rows, intercropping, and using fertilizer. The project supplied improved seed for three crops: maize, beans and cassava. Over 80% of the farmers planted in rows and used fertilizers to increase their productivity. As a result, Rwinkwavu's former subsistence farmers expected a harvest of over 8,000 tones of maize and about 10,000 tons of sorghum. Unfortunately, however, they lacked transport and experienced difficulty in marketing their surplus.
When the author of this chapter, Arthur Rugango, undertook his field research which forms the basis of this Chapter, CHDI had initiated efforts, in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture, to provide for transport to market and ensure the farmers received adequate prices for their expanded crop production. His research offers yet another example of the importance of implementing problem-solving's fourth step: Engaging those affected in providing the evidence necessary to evaluate new rules' implementation and social impact to ensure their continuing improvement.
Box 7-1: GLOSSARY
CHDI: Clinton Hunter Development Initiative.
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization.
GoR: Government of Rwanda.
MoJ: Minister of Justice.
MINAGRI: Ministry of Agriculture.
OCIR-CAFÉ: Office des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda – Café (Coffee Board)
OCIR-THE: Office des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda – The (Tea Board)
PELUM : Participatory Ecological Land-Use Management.
RADA : Rwanda Agriculture Development Authority.
RARDA : Rwanda Agriculture and Research Development Agency.
ICARRD: International Conference on African Reform and Rural Development.
ICLAD: International Consortium for Law and Development.
IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development.
ISAE: Higher Institute of Agriculture and Animal Production.
ISAR: Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du Rwanda.
SPAT: Strategic Plan for Agriculture Transformation.
INTRODUCTION: THE LARGER CONTEXT OF THE SOCIAL
PROBLEM CONFRONTING THE RWINKAVU SUBSISTENCE FARMERS
With government assistance, 17 percent of all Rwandan farmers grow profitable cash crops, mostly coffee and tea, introduced by the government in the colonial era. Agricultural extension programs – OCIR-Thé and OCIR-Café, respectively – provide these tea and coffee farmers with specialized agricultural extension services,502 helping them to gain easy access to seeds, transport, appropriate technology, credit, and markets for their produce.503 In 2007, these farmers had become relatively well-to-do.
That same year, in contrast, eighty-three percent of all farmers in Rwanda struggled to grow enough crops to achieve bare subsistence – many of them at below poverty levels. Primarily, to feed their families, they grew food crops like sorghum, maize, potatoes, cassava, and vegetables.
Using problem-solving's four steps, this chapter's Part II reports briefly on a field investigation of the relevant facts as to –
- the nature of the difficulties confronted by Rwinkwavu District's small farmers, and whose and what behaviors contributed to them;
- identify the causes of the role occupants' critical problematic behaviors: those of the small farmers, and the district agronomes;
- the CHDI pilot project as a possible solution which, if it proved cost-effective, might lay a basis for MINAGRI regulations504to alter or eliminate the causes of both sets of problematic behaviors, and induce the new behaviors required to help overcome those difficulties; and
- a brief assessment of the implementation and social impact of the CHDI pilot project's implementation and social impact as an essential prerequisite to designing and drafting MINIAGRI regulations to strengthen district level agronomes' efforts to empower small farmers to increase their production and sale of crops as the essential basis for overcoming prevalent malnutrition.
PROBLEM-SOLVING'S STEP 1: LOW LEVELS OF SMALL FARMERS' CROP PRODUCTION AND SALES, AND WHOSE AND WHAT BEHAVIORS CONTRIBUTED TO IT:
A. The surface appearances of the problem that confronted Rwinkwavu's poor subsistence farmers
[Here provide a map of Rwanda, showing Kayonza District, and within it, Rwinkavu Sector; and, if possible, include Nkondu I and II??]
In 2007, the poor farmers of Rwinkwavu – like all those in the more remote rural districts in Rwanda – barely produced enough food for their families' subsistence. The majority of farmers had access to roughly one hectare (ha) of land. From that, they typically harvested between 1.5-2 tons of sorghum or maize. The handful of government-funded agronomes in the Kayonza district, including the Rwinkwavu sector, did little to help these impoverished farmers increase their productivity.505
Poor subsistence farmers usually do not have transport to favorable markets. For example, Uwihoreye Silivani -- a woman farmer, as well as a school teacher,506 in Nkondo II village, Rwinkwavu – had to sell the small surplus of crops grown on her farm to middlemen who owned trucks. The middlemen typically paid the farmers low prices that barely covered the costs of producing the crops. As Ms. Silivani explained,
B. Whose and what behaviors constitute the social problem 508
Law can only help to resolve social problems by changing the repetitive patterns of relevant social behavior patterns (by definition the institutions509) that contribute to them. This section briefly describes the problematic behaviors of the relevant social actors ('role occupants'510) in the Rwinkwavu sector of Kayonza District: the majority of poor subsistence farmers and the district government agronomes.511
Historically, the subsistence farmers had never had access to government extension services. They mainly farmed in traditional ways, barely producing enough for their families' subsistence needs. Since many young men traveled in search of better-paying work in the region's export sectors, a significant proportion of the farmers in Rwinkwavu, perhaps 60 percent, comprised women farmers. As one farmer said,
A female agronome, employed by CHDI,513 observed,
In 2005, as part of a decentralization program, the Rwandan Government established a system of agronomes under the Mayor's Office in the Kayonza District, which included Rwinkwavu.
Supposedly, these district agronomes would provide the extension services to help the 48,000 subsistence-farmers gain access to the land with sufficient water, seed and fertilizer, appropriate technology to enable them to increase their production and sell crops in the available markets.
After the 2005 decentralization policy went into effect, MINAGRI continued to formulate overall strategy and policy. It established four new agencies – RADA, RARDA, ISAR and ISAE – to implement its policy in the districts. In that context, the district agronomes' main duties included empowering poor subsistence farmers by providing them with knowledge on how to use fertilizers, new seed varieties, and new affordable technologies; access credit; and process, store and transport produce to the markets. At the same time, the district agronomes had the task of monitoring, evaluating, coordinating and advising the district's implementation of MINAGRI policy at the district level.
The Kayonza district government supposedly provided extension services to the poor subsistence farmers through sector agronomes, cell coordinators and village coordinators. Because the district agronomes had responsibility for servicing 48,000 households, the individual poor subsistence farmers receive little if any assistance.514 Also because the district agronomes spent most of their time at the district offices or traveling to Kigali for seminars and meetings, they had little time to work with individual subsistence farmers. A press report described their problematic behaviors:
Asked about how she worked with the Kayonza sector agent responsible for overseeing all the extension officers in Rwinkwavu, a CHDI agronome responded:
He's the one who heads all the agriculture extension officers in this area.
A: No we don't, all he does is oversee what we do.
Q: Does he earn a bigger salary than you do?
A: No he doesn't earn more, we earn the same salary.
Q: So why doesn't he work closely with you?
A: I don't know, may be it's because he works under the government, so we work under him.
Q: Does he ask you for reports?
A: He doesn't ask for reports, though that's what he's supposed to be doing.
Q: Do you know what he's in charge of administratively?
A: He's in charge of farming and cooperatives.516
To summarize, despite the government's decentralization program, the problematic behaviors of two sets of social actors – in legislative theory, termed 'role occupants' – did little to help many subsistence farmers in the Rwinkwavu District: (1) the farmers, themselves, who did not use up-dated farming techniques to increase their output; and (2) the district agronomes – essentially agricultural extension agents – who did little to help the farmers either to augment their output or to market their surplus crops.
PROBLEM-SOLVING'S STEP 2: GATHERING THE FACTS AS TO THE PROBABLE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEMATIC BEHAVIORS IDENTIFIED IN PROBLEM-SOLVING'S STEP 1
Institutionalist legislative theory underscores the importance of analyzing the evidence as to the causes of the problematic behaviors of relevant social actors, here the subsistence farmers and the district agronomes. Legislative drafters must gather the facts to demonstrate that hypotheses as to those causes prove consistent with the available evidence. Once they prove that, then in problem-solving's third step, they can logically design detailed legislative provisions likely to alter or eliminate those causes and induce behaviors to help resolve the targeted problem. A brief review of the ROCCIPI categories suggests hypotheses as to the causes of each set of these role occupants' problematic behaviors:
A. Rwinkavu's subsistence farmers levels of productivity remained low, and they had little knowledge about how to improve it
Rule: The existing laws did not prescribe how subsistence farmers should change their behaviors. Essentially, influenced by the non-legal circumstances prevailing in Rwinkwavu District, they continued to behave in traditional ways.
Opportunity and Capacity: Although most of Rwinkwavu's farmers seemed poor, a small handful appeared significantly better off. One woman, the CHDI Village Coordinator of Nkondo II Village, owned only a hectare of land. She characterized herself as "among the poor farmers…. far much different from the rich farmers." She explained,
Asked how many rich farmers lived in her agglomeration village, she said, "not more than five."517 She then answered a series of additional questions concerning most poor farmers' conditions:
A: No, because most of the farmers are poor, we just learned how to use fertilizers and new methods of planting in lines only recently.
Q: So you can't get any loans from the bank because you have no securities?
A: No.
Q: How do you get your produce to the market?
A: Among the poor farmers, those who have quite a big harvest are the ones who sell to the business people who come here to buy the produce.
Q: Is it possible for you to do food processing for your products?
A: No the farmers don't have the capability to do so.
Q: What do you think causes that poverty?
A: According to my observation, poverty is caused by unfavorable weather conditions, which greatly affect cultivation, and also having to raise many children and feed them all. Another thing can also be scarcity of jobs.
Q: Does poverty hinder you from using proper irrigation methods?
A: The methods used in irrigation, are poor because most people use a basin of water, and sprinkle with their hands, which is not effective.
Q: What do you think is the role of women, as today is women's day?
A: Women play a big role in raising their families and taking care of them. They no longer spend their time at home but instead they go out and work, like helping to build houses, cultivating for the rich farmers, to earn something that can help raise the family.518
Most of Rwinkwavu's small farmers had only small plots of land, many less than a hectare, on which they traditionally grew crops primarily for their families' subsistence. They used simple farm tools like hoes, which limited their capacity to expand productivity. They knew little about modern farming techniques. Even then, some complained that they did not receive enough individual attention. They used hand tools.
A: We have a problem of getting tools because, the only tool most farmers can have is a hoe, and we lack tools like wheelbarrows, which are very few in this area.519
Some did not know how to get loans to buy better tools or equipment: As some small farmers admitted,
Moreover, few had any means of transporting their limited surplus agricultural produce to the nearest market. The intermediaries who owned trucks paid them low prices (discouraging the farmers from expanding production further), and reaped the real profits for themselves by selling the produce to buyers in distant markets. A schoolteacher, a woman, who had accumulated a little more land than others accumulated, and employed a few workers to harvest her crop, explained:
Despite the District agronomes' efforts to persuade them to form cooperatives, few of the Rwinkwavu farmers who worked on the hill-sides joined them, or organized into groups to cooperate to process or market their crops. Some simply asserted,
Communication: Poor Rwinkwavu farmers apparently seldom received either visits or information from the district government agronomes about the newly introduced rules for agricultural extension assistance.522
Interest: Unless they could market their surpluses at sufficiently high prices, the Rwinkwavu farmers seemed unlikely to expand further their output.
Process: Many poor hillside farmers apparently rejected MINAGRI policy, recommended by the government district agronomes, to organize into cooperatives to increase their capacity to produce and market crops and maximize their profits. Instead, most Rwinkwavu farmers living on the hillsides seemed to prefer to make their production and marketing decisions alone.
Ideology: Traditional attitudes sometimes hindered farmers adoption of new methods. As one CHDI agronome put it,
Many hillside farmers apparently believed that only farmers who worked in the swamp lands should join cooperatives. Some simply stated,
B. The causes of the government agronomes' problematic Behaviors
Rule: The 2005 decentralization law did prescribe that district agronomes should assist small farmers to increase their output and marketing of crops, but did not specify detailed criteria and procedures, giving them discretion as to whether, when, and how to do it.525
Opportunity and Capacity: The Kayonza district agronomes worked under pressure of performance contracts. Because they lacked experience, they did not quickly respond to problems posed by farmers. In most cases, the district agronomes relied more on non-government partners. As reflected in the following interview, some NGOs provided expert help to 'relatively young graduates' among the district agronomes:
In addition to extension work in Kayonza, other administrative duties seemed to overwhelm district agronomes: They must attend meetings at the district offices. Because the district offices lack sufficient professional staff members, some district agronomes, while addressing farmers' concerns, must coordinate gacaca courts527 which deal with government policy on unity and reconciliation.
When asked if, as a poor farmer and Village Coordinator of Nkondo II Village, she had received a visit from a district government extension officer, Christine Nzamshaka asserted,
"Well, all the time I've been here I haven't seen any agriculture extension officer from the government, so if they were helping I would know, since I am the head of the agglomeration village, Therefore I cannot guarantee that they are reaching any of the farmers because they would have to go through me.
Communication: As Nzamshaka's comment suggest, the district government's agronomes apparently did little to communicate with the Rwinkwavu peasants about the government's new efforts to provide them assistance directed to increasing their production and marketing of crops.
Interest: The available evidence suggests that district agronomes found it more in their interest to conduct office business than to communicate with and help the poor small farmers resolve their production and marketing problems.
Process: As Christina Nzamshaka, Village Coordinator of Nkondo II village, testified,528 the district agronomes seldom contacted or discussed issues with the poor farmers. That suggests that those agronomes made decisions – not in response to the peasants' own needs or concerns – but based on their own or their superiors' initiatives, or perhaps those of non-government partners from whom they sought assistance.
Ideology: (Does anyone have any evidence re district agronomes' 'ideologies' about small poor peasants' capacity, interest, etc?)
In sum, the district agency agronomes, responsible for implementing MINAGRI policy, apparently lacked the capacity, and seldom managed to find time to help small farmers improve their farming practices. In 2006, planning to increase farm productivity as an essential element in providing better health care, the Clinton Foundation, in cooperation with Partners-in-Health,529 introduced the non-governmental pilot agronome project, Clinton Hunter Development Foundation CDHI.
THE CHDI'S PROPOSED SOLUTION:
A PILOT PROJECT TO STRENGTHEN THE RWINGKAVU'S AGRONOME SYSTEM
This research report's Part IV contains two sections: one related to the Rwinkwavu CHDI pilot project, and a second that describes a proposed Monitoring and Evaluation mechanism.
A. The Rwinkwavu CHDI pilot project- a possible way to empower rural farmers to improve their crop production and marketing
The Rwinkwavu CHDI pilot project aimed to change two sets of role occupants' behaviors that apparently contributed to the low levels of agricultural productivity and poverty characteristic of the Rwinkwavu District: The small subsistence farmers, and the Rwandan District Government agronomes. To do this, CHDI decided to hire some experienced agronomes to serve the 6000 small farm families in the Rwinkwavu sector. Presumably, if CHDI's pilot project proved successful in increasing small farmers' output and sales to augment their cash incomes and quality of life, the Rwandan government might incorporate its rules into a detailed legislative program to change government agronomes' behaviors on a national level.
In this case, the social problem consisted of the existing Rwandan Government-run agronome system's failure to empower small farmers to expand their output to earn enough income to improve their families' health and overall quality of life. In that context, the agronomes at the local and district level comprised key players in the 'decision-making processes' that determined agricultural extension policy. Their decision-making behaviors determined which farmers received what kinds of extension services.
Self-evidently, neither the CHDI pilot project nor a potential governmental legislative program could simply order existing extension service institutions to 'help the district's subsistence farmers.' Initially, new CHDI rules, and eventually an effectively implemented government ruling, seemed necessary to help alter or eliminate the causes of the 'problematic behaviors' of the agronomes, as well as of the farmers themselves. Only then would they likely work together to equip the farmers to take advantage of government programs to learn new farming methods to increase their crop sales and family incomes.
As its first step, CHDI set up a district office in Rwinkwavu and employed 10 experienced agronomes, significantly increasing the presence of agronomes per farmer in the sector.
Diagram 7-1: Availability of government agronomes who worked in Kayonza District, compared to CHDI's Rwinkwavu Sector:
(Editors' Query: Is it possible to obtain information regarding the numbers that are missing here?)
In an interview, CHDI's Executive Secretary described the pilot project's structure:
Q: What do you do as an executive secretary when you come to your office on a typical day?
A: We usually have a weekly and monthly schedule, so I wake up in the morning knowing exactly what I'm going to do, so if it's a meeting with the people then I know we are going to talk about agriculture, health or education. They come in big numbers because they're invited by the head of the cell. We talk about the government program. I tell them what is expected of them on issues, like agriculture; how they're supposed to cultivate, apply fertilizers, and how they should store the produce. They are then given the chance to tell us the problems that they encounter and how we can help them as leaders. So I know what I'm supposed to do each day.
Q: How many people come to attend these meetings, from a sector?
A: We get at least 2000 people in one meeting.
Q: What do you do for follow up after these meetings?
A: We record the results of the meetings and then send some of them to the district and the others to the sector where they are given to the department in charge; if it's agriculture they are given to the agriculture extension officer to follow up. For example, if we said that every cell has to store about 1000 tons just for security in case of scarcity or increase in prices, then the agriculture extension officer has to follow up if the people are doing it. This is done through the agglomeration villages.
Q: During these meetings, do you get the ideas from the people themselves or do you bring orders from the authorities?
A.We follow a government programme, but we get the ideas of how it should be done from the people themselves, so most of the solutions come from the people. We show them what we want to do as the development agency, and they do the rest. The only thing we can do to help is to help them find the materials they need.
In short, CHDI 'rules' required the agronomes to engage the Rwinkwavu farmers, themselves, in learning and helping each other to overcome their constraints and build on their own resources to increase the production and marketing of their crops. Problem-solving's Step 4, and final part of this chapter, reports on the farmers' own evidence as to the CHDI program's implementation and impact.
C. Monitoring and evaluating the CHDI project
As required by legislative theory's problem-solving's 4th step, this section reviews the limited evidence generated by interviews as to the extent to which the farmers and the CHDI agronomes seemed to think the CHDI pilot project had, or would likely, help to resolve the obstacles Rwinkwavu hillside farmers confronted in their efforts to increase crop production and marketing. Using the ROCCIPI categories as a guide, the interview questions aimed to discover evidence as to the CHDI project's effect in helping to alter or eliminate all the possible causes, identified in problem-solving Step 2, for the problematic behaviors of Rwinkwavu's subsistence farmers and the district agronomes.
C. Small farmers
Rule: (Can anyone help us find the 2005 law re agronomes and whether it includes any prescriptions for small farmers' 'behaviors'?)
Opportunity and Capacity: Asked whether the CHDI agronomes helped them produce more for markets, the school teacher/farmer replied,
Q. Where did you get the seeds from?
A. They gave us the seeds too.
Q. So they gave you the seeds, the fertilizers, and they even went on to follow you up, you now have a big harvest but you don't have the market.
A. All we need now is their help in finding market for our harvest.530
The Village Coordinator of Nkondo II village explained why the farmers had enjoyed an improved harvest that year:
Q: Do you think Clinton Foundation was a God-send or may be that's how things just had to work out?
A: There's nothing that can happen without God's will being done.
Q: So, if it wasn't for Clinton Foundation that you got fertilizers, the rain wouldn't have helped much?
A: No, when it rains here the crops usually grow, but the difference is that the harvest was better, for example the maize harvest was much more and of a better quality, the fertilizers did have a great impact.531
A group of poor farmers532 pointed out,
Q: At which price would you like to sell a kilo of beans?
A: At least 200frws.
Q: Suppose you harvest 2 tons of beans, how do you get them to the market?
A: Our customers come to pick them from home.
Q: Do they underpay you?
A: Yes they do.
Q: So you would rather take them to the market yourselves.
A: Yes
Communication: The CHDI agronomes relied on farmers who became voluntary community organizers to help to educate their neighbors on the benefits of innovations like cooperatives. For example, one community organizer told the interviewer:
Q: What can you suggest as solutions to some of these problems?
A: Some of the solutions are forming cooperatives, which can help them get loans easily, and also teach them how to store food which they still don't understand.
Q: How do they get the products to the market after harvesting and storing?
A: It's a big problem because they either have to carry the products all the way to the market by themselves where they sometimes have to cover 30km or those with transport come to buy the products and the farmers are underpaid.
Q: Don't these cooperatives have ideas of how they can improve on their harvest?
A: The cooperatives lack proper advice and the people still have very low levels of understanding.
Q: What do you think about the agriculture extension officers, being very few and not being able to reach everyone?
A: The agriculture extension officers are very few, but if members of the committee from the agglomeration villages were mobilized, and given the knowledge then it would be more effective to the farmers.
Q: Do you think if the government got means of increasing the agriculture extension officers, they would have to bring in a lot more.
A: Yes they would have to be a lot more of them.
Interest: At the interview with a group of poor farmers, several indicated a real interest in the potential for learning from the CHDI agronomes:
Q: Does that mean they are not enough?
A: Yes they are not enough.
Q: Do you think the agriculture extension officers have got enough knowledge, in helping you get your goods to be on the market?
A: They do have the knowledge, according to what we have learnt from them, the only problem we have is that they are few, and if an agriculture extension officer is taking care of 500 people alone, then he won't be able to satisfy the needs of everyone. So we need more of them.
Process: As illustrated by their differing comments about the possibilities of working together in cooperatives,533the hillside farmers typically seemed used to making their decisions as individuals, rather than through a group process.
Ideology: Some hillside farmers seemed to accept the tradition that only swamp dwellers would join cooperatives. Others, like the community organizer quoted above, seemed convinced by the CHDI agronomes' argument that, if they joined cooperatives, they would find it easier to gain access to markets or loans.
To sum up, the individual poor farmers expressed differing views about the CHDI's potential for helping them to overcome the many obstacles to their efforts to increasing their production and marketing their crops to increase their incomes. The volunteer Village Coordinator and community organizer interviewed seemed more optimistic about the possibilities, and willing to work with their neighbors to realize them.
D. CHDI agronomes
Rule: [Can anyone help us to find the existing law (including Miniagri regulations) re the use of agronomes, including those provided by donor agencies like CHDI?]
Opportunity and Capacity: Each CHDI agronome has responsibility for working with a large number of farmers. In answering a question about the number of people she supervised, one explained:534
Q: How many homes are in one cell?
A: There are 6000 homes in one cell.
Q: So each one of you is responsible for 3000 homes?
A: That depends on how big the agglomeration villages are. Q: So now how do you do it?
A: If I've decided to work with two villages, we make the arrangements and then I can teach them using field demonstration methods.
Q: How many people do you teach in a day?
A: I teach at least 120 people.
Q: Does that mean you can teach about 2000 people in a month?
A: Yes, 2000 people or even more depending on the attendance."
The agronomes recognize the need to follow up with the individual farmers. However, since they must walk from farm to farm, they have trouble in following up with them all. One CHDI village coordinator commented,
Q; " So what do you think you need right now"?
A: " An easier way of moving from place to place in reaching the farmers."
Q: " How many pairs of shoes do you use in a month"?
A; " I use boots which are much stronger."
This Village Coordinator suggested the establishing centers might reduce the time farmers needed to access seeds, fertilizers, and other inputs:
A. We need access to seeds, whereby centers can be set up to sell the seeds, pesticides and all the other inputs.
Q. Where can these centers be put up?
A. They can be put up at the districts.
Q. How would that help?
A. People would not have to move long distances to buy seeds, which would reduce the expenses.
This suggested the need to explore ways to expand the agronomes' contributions, perhaps by further involving the farmers themselves. In answering a question about the role of CHDI agronomes, one Village Coordinator, Christine Nzumushaka, explained:
Q: People have different problems, so if the agriculture extension officer corrects your problem as a leader, won't he/she might think that's the case for everyone, yet the problems vary?
A: We as leaders, do not talk for ourselves, we talk on behalf of the people.
Q: Do you think, the people are pleased with what the agriculture extension officers are doing, or you think you need more of them?
A: I think we need others because, when there's a lot of work they use those farmers who already have the knowledge to help them, which is as a result of being few.
Q: So the knowledge is not actually sufficient.
A: It's not sufficient, but when they go through the grass root leaders, because there's nothing they can do without their help, work is made easier for them.
As the agronomes, themselves, emphasized, marketing remained a major problem.
The CHDI, together with the government's district authorities undertook negotiations with RADA, under the Ministry of Agriculture, to set prices with agro-based industries to buy the farmers' extra produce. The agronomes listed the farmers who did a good job in hopes of encouraging other farmers to improve their output.535
The CHDI also proposed to establish centers near to their farming areas to enable farmers to obtain the seeds, pesticides, and other essential inputs.
Communication: Apparently, CHDI agronomes knew little about Rwandan government laws relating to their work. One CHDI agronome responded when asked,
Q: "Do you know of any law that you as agriculture extension officers are supposed to go by?"
A: "No, I don't know of anything like that."536
Interest: The CHDI agronomes interviewed seemed aware of the importance of engaging community leaders in helping to inform and empower the small farmers to use their own resources more effectively, both as individuals and in groups, to increase their productivity.537
Process: The CHDI agronomes and the Executive Secretary all emphasized the importance of informing the community members and leaders, and helping them work together, to make decisions likely to prove beneficial to the community.538
Ideology: he CHDI staff members all shared the belief that by systematically demonstrating the appropriate farming methods and engaging the community members in pooling their efforts for marketing and accessing credit they could increase their productivity and sales to increase their incomes.
In short, although limited in numbers, the CHDI leaders and staff had begun to educate and engage the farming community members in working together to overcome the obstacles that had hindered their efforts to expand their output and sales as an essential foundation for improving their quality of life. Where they encountered problems, like those of inadequate transport, marketing, and credit, they had begun working with Miniagri to develop solutions.
The evidence gathered by interviewing the relevant social actors responsible for expanding agricultural crop production and sales does offer insights into the nature and causes of their problematic behaviors. The interviews with those involved in the CHDI pilot project – both the peasants and the agronomes themselves also suggest that employment of more well-trained agronomes, working closely with community leaders, can significantly help poor farmers to increase their productivity and resolve the problems of selling their crops to improve their families' incomes and quality of life.
Self-evidently, further field research could provide important evidence as to the kinds of training and experience the CHDI agronomes had before working on the Rwinkwavu pilot project. Equally important, it could illuminate the possibilities that agronomes, in turn, could engage the farmers themselves in a learning-by-doing process to help each other to improve their productive capacity. Further evidence seems essential to assess the role of centers of the kind CHDI has begun to establish in Rwinkwavu, not only to service farming communities' needs for access to markets, but also to help them obtain appropriate technologies and the credit needed to pay for them. Eventually, small enterprises might begin to produce appropriate tools and equipment, providing additional sources of cash income for the farmers' family members.
Perhaps the proposed EAC Health Commission might work with university faculty and students, as well as regional ministries of agriculture, to gather that kind of evidence as a basis for designing and drafting legislation to train agronomes to participate in extending the pilot project to other impoverished districts and provinces, not only in Rwanda, but throughout the region. Perhaps it would help to determine whether, and the extent to which, EAC governments could cooperate in developing regional resources to increase the scale and reduce the costs of providing training for agronomes and farm community leaders to improve agricultural production and sales as an important contribution to improving health throughout the region.
In short, this chapter suggests that pilot projects of the kind initiated by CHDI seem to hold promise for helping small farmers in remote rural areas to overcome the prevalent obstacles to expanding their production, raising their incomes, as essential measures likely to empower them to improve their health and quality of life.
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